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Gideon Exceptionalism?
ABSTRACT. There is no doubt that Gideon v. Wainwright is extraordinary, but in thinking
about its uniqueness, we are reminded of "American exceptionalism" and the diametrically
opposed meanings that advocates have ascribed to the phrase. Gideon too is exceptional, in both
the laudatory and disparaging sense. As we set forth in this Essay, we think Gideon is both a
"shining city on a hill" in the world of criminal procedure and something of a sham. We first
discuss the extraordinary features of the decision itself, then lay out how it has survived largely
intact, unlike virtually all other Warren Court criminal procedure decisions. Then we turn to the
bleaker side of the Gideon story, first illuminating how the stingy law of ineffective assistance of
counsel renders Gideon's "shining city" illusory for many defendants, and then showing how the
routine denial of investigative and expert assistance to indigent defendants further undercuts
Gideon's promise. We conclude that the mere presence of an attorney is no panacea for the ills of
the twenty-first-century criminal justice system. Unless and until the Supreme Court both
significantly raises the bar as to the quality of representation that satisfies the Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel and takes action by requiring states to provide more
than paltry investigative and expert services to indigent defendants, Gideon will remain an
unfulfilled promise.
AUTHOR S. John H. Blume is Professor of Law at Cornell Law School; Sheri Lynn Johnson is
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INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that Gideon v. Wainwright' is extraordinary. But
extraordinariness can come in more than one flavor. In thinking about Gideon,
we were reminded of "American exceptionalism," and the diametrically
opposed meanings that advocates have ascribed to the phrase. American
exceptionalism posits that the United States is qualitatively different from
other countries, primarily because it has a specific world mission to spread
democracy and liberty.
The related image of the United States as a biblical "citty upon a hill" has
deep roots, stemming from a sermon by John Winthrop to the Puritan
colonists in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.' The phrase "American
exceptionalism," however, is bipolar, having been employed almost as
frequently to disparage as to laud. It became popular in the 1920S when Stalin
used it to chastise American communists who heretically claimed that
America's superior resources and lack of class distinctions freed it from Marxist
laws of history.' However, American conservatives and eventually
neoconservatives came to use the term-along with the image of the "shining
city on the hill"' -to assert superiority and exemption from both the historical
forces and rigid class immobility that have affected other countries.s That view,
in turn, has prompted a fierce backlash in this century, including both
normative objections that the morally tainted history of the United States
precludes any role as an exemplar of virtue,6 and positive arguments that social
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. John Winthrop, Model of Christian Charity (1630), in 7 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTOIUCAL SOCIETY 31, 47 (Boston, Freeman & Bolles 3 d ed. 1838) ("For
wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill.").
3. ALBERT FRIED, COMMUNISM IN AMERICA: A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS 7-8 (1996).
4. In the last half of the twentieth century, two Presidents used this image as well. See John F.
Kennedy, President-Elect, Address Delivered to a Joint Convention of the General Court of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Jan. 9, 1961) ("[O]ur governments, in every branch,
at every level . . . must be as a city up on a hill . . . ."); President Ronald Reagan, Remarks
Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Dallas,
Texas (Aug. 23, 1984) ("We proclaimed a dream of an America that would be a 'shining city
on a hill."').
5. Harold Hongju Koh, America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 112 (Michael Ignatieffed., 2005)





mobility in the United States is less than it is in many other countries.
We don't pretend to have any expertise on American exceptionalism, but
we do see parallels to our own thinking about Gideon. However, unlike the
participants in the American exceptionalism debates, we have trouble deciding
whether we find the laudatory or the disparaging meaning of "Gideon
exceptionalism" more compelling. As set forth below, we think Gideon is both a
"shining city on a hill" in the world of criminal procedure, and something of a
sham. Part I sets forth the extraordinary features of the decision itself, and Part
II echoes the aspirational meaning of "Gideon exceptionalism," laying out how
the decision has survived largely intact, in sharp comparison to other landmark
Warren Court criminal procedure decisions. Part III reverses course, examining
how the law of ineffective assistance of counsel renders Gideon's "shining city"
illusory for many defendants. Part IV concludes by explaining how the routine
denial of investigative and expert assistance to indigent defendants further
undercuts Gideon's promise.
I. THE GIDEON REVOLUTION
A. The Decision
Prior to Gideon, the Supreme Court had held that due process required
states to provide counsel for indigent defendants under certain narrow
circumstances. In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, faced with well-known and
outrageous facts, the Court held that "in a capital case, where the defendant is
unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him."8
But later, in Betts v. Brady,' the Court explicitly held that the Due Process
Clause did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
counsel against the states.
Three decades later, Gideon, quoting the language of Powell, held that even
in a noncapital case, a showing of particular incapacity was unnecessary:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
7. See, e.g., Paul De Grauwe, Structural Rigidities in the US and Europe, Vox (July 2, 2007),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/us-vs-europe-structural-rigidities-re-think.
8. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
9. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.'o
B. How Do I Love Gideon? Let Me Count the Ways
Gideon may not inspire sonnets, but it does inspire accolades. Praise starts
from the ironic underlying facts. An unemployed, uneducated felon who had
failed in trying to defend himself against theft charges sent a handwritten note
to the Supreme Court. That note, interpreted as a petition for a writ of
certiorari, led to the appointment of preeminent lawyer and future Supreme
Court Justice Abe Fortas to brief and argue the case. After the Court ruled that
the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of a lawyer, Clarence Gideon
was retried and acquitted." As David Cole notes, "Gideon's story reaffirms all
that is best in the American justice system. . . . His story illustrates that the
justice system can work for the most vulnerable among us . . . ."" Or, as Earl
Warren's biographer put it, "no tale so affirmed the American democracy. No
story broadcast around the world so clearly proclaimed that not just the rich
received justice in American courts.""
But Gideon was not only a symbolic victory. It transformed criminal
"justice" for thousands of indigent defendants incarcerated when it was
decided. As the state's brief had pointed out, over five thousand criminal
defendants who had not been represented by counsel were incarcerated in
Florida alone,'4 and there were a number of other states that had not routinely
provided counsel. Although the state had urged the Supreme Court that if it
10. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
11. ANTHONY LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 238 (1964).
iz. David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STOIuES 101, 102 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 20o6).
13. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 405-o6 (1997).




were to decide in Gideon's favor, it should make the decision prospective, the
Court declined to do so. Instead, thousands of unrepresented prisoners were
released, many of whom could not be retried. Indeed, retroactivity doctrine
itself recognizes Gideon's iconic nature; Gideon is the only decision ever cited by
the Supreme Court as an example of the kind of watershed rule of criminal
procedure that so implicates fundamental fairness as to require retroactive
application in habeas corpus."
Moreover, with respect to the number of future cases affected, Gideon is
unparalleled. More than a million felony defendants may be sentenced in a
given year," and somewhere between two-thirds and four-fifths are indigent."
It is impossible to know how many of the thirteen states that prior to Gideon
did not require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants would have
done so in its absence, or when those states would have done so. It is also
impossible to know whether in the absence of Gideon, budget pressures would
have led some of the states that had previously required such appointments to
regress. It is nonetheless clear that very large numbers of future defendants
were affected by the decision. Moreover, although we criticize the application
of the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel later in this Essay, without
Gideon, there would have been absolutely no constitutional floor for the quality
of representation provided. All things considered, in a contest for the single
most important criminal procedure decision the Supreme Court has ever
rendered, Gideon has no real competition.
II. GIDEON'S PERSISTENCE
In addition to its symbolic and practical significance, Gideon stands out
among the Warren Court "criminal procedure revolution" decisions for its
15. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989).
16. Felony Defendants, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=231 (last
updated Mar. 25, 2013).
17. These numbers are from older studies because even recent reports on indigent defense cite
data from the late 1990s, suggesting that reliable new data is not available. See, e.g.,
Maureen McGough, Indigent Defense: International Perspectives and Research Needs, NAT'L
INST. JUST. J., Oct. 2011, at 36.
18. While it is true that the development of the incorporation doctrine, which applies the
commands of the Bill of Rights against the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, lays the foundation for Gideon and most of the rest of
constitutional criminal procedure and thus could be argued to be more foundational,
incorporation developed more slowly. Thus no single decision in that line of cases can be
seen as a "shining city."
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continued vitality. Although the Warren Court decided more than six hundred
criminal cases," with the exception of Gideon, the best known and most
significant of these decisions have been significantly weakened by the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.
A. Mapp v. Ohio's Contraction
Mapp,2 o decided in 1961, and dubbed by Yale Kamisar as "The First Shot
Fired in the Warren Court's Criminal Procedure 'Revolution, held that "all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the [Fourth
Amendment] is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." 2 The
Court relied upon the need for a "deterrent safeguard . . . without which the
Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to a 'form of words,'". and the
premise that "in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was logically and
constitutionally necessary" to extend the exclusionary rule as well.' Mapp's
rationale was soon narrowed, however, and over time its sweep sharply
curtailed.
First, even before the Warren Court disbanded, the "constitutionally
necessary" rationale began to erode; Linkletter v. Walker emphasized the
deterrence rationale in deciding that Mapp was not retroactive to cases that had
become "final" prior to Mapp.2 s Then the Burger Court, in United States v.
Calandra," while deciding that grand jury witnesses must answer questions
even when based on the fruits of an illegal search, declared that whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied was "a question, not of rights, but of
remedies," and one whose answer must be determined by weighing the likely
costs of the rule against the likely benefits.27
ig. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 ("In the sixteen years of Chief Justice Warren's tenure, the
Supreme Court decided upwards of 6oo criminal cases.").
20. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The First Shot Fired in the Warren Court's Criminal Procedure
"Revolution," in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIEs, supra note 12, at 45, 45.
22. 367 U.S. at 655.
23. Id. at 648 (quoting Silverthoen Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
24. Id. at 655-56.
25. 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
26. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
27. Id. at 354.
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This narrowed rationale in turn facilitated a total disregard of Mapp's
broadly inclusive "inadmissible in a state court" language, transforming the
exclusionary rule into a barrier limited to criminal cases and forfeiture
proceedings;8 it did not apply in any civil cases," not even in deportation
proceedingso or parole revocation hearings." Second, the Burger Court crafted
the so-called "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in criminal cases
where evidence was obtained by officers acting in good-faith reasonable
reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate despite the
absence of probable cause." Moreover, as the Roberts Court decided, if an
officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant, even if that
belief is erroneous and caused by another police officer's negligence, fruits of
that unconstitutional arrest are exempt from the exclusionary rule." Finally, it
should be observed that this catalogue of exclusionary rule cutbacks has been
accompanied by sharp cutbacks in the substantive contours of the Fourth
Amendment, thus decreasing the number of cases to which Mapp might apply.
B. Miranda v. Arizona's Contraction
Miranda' held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the admission of
statements obtained from a suspect interrogated in custody unless he has been
informed of his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of counsel,
as well as the fact that statements he makes may be used against him, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him at state expense.
Miranda also constrains police in what they must do after providing warnings
if resulting statements are to be admissible: seek a knowing and intelligent
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, and upon assertion of the right to counsel,
cease all questioning.
Miranda, unlike Gideon but like Mapp, has been at least as much excoriated
28. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
29. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 437 (1976) (noting that the exclusionary rule has never
been applied to a civil proceeding, state or federal).
30. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
31. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1986).
32. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
33. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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as praised." Also unlike Gideon, but like Mapp, its protection was soon pruned.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court determined that the "interrogation"
sufficient to trigger the protection of Miranda was limited to questions or their
functional equivalent, and then held that the functional equivalent of questions
was "any words or actions on the part of the police. .. that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.", 8 As Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, questions are not "reasonably likely" to elicit
a response, let alone an incriminating response, but are merely intended to do
SO." Hence, Innis substantially narrowed the ordinary meaning of questioning.
Moreover, the facts of Innis made it quite clear that the majority was prepared
to require an awful lot before finding remarks "reasonably likely" to elicit an
incriminating response, given the officer's statement, "[T]here's a lot of
handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves."o As Justice
Marshall's dissent pointed out,
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a
suspect-any suspect-than the assertion that if the weapon is not
found an innocent person will be hurt or killed.... As a matter of fact,
the appeal to a suspect to confess for the sake of others, to "display
some evidence of decency and honor," is a classic interrogation
technique.4'
Justice Marshall cited an interrogation handbook containing that
technique*4 - the very handbook cited by the Miranda Court.43 Additionally, the
other prerequisite to Miranda's protections - custody- also was defined with
increasing stringency in Beckwith v. United States' and Berkemer v. McCarty,45
37. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Ross Feldmann, Education and Interrogation:
Comparing Brown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 337-42 (2005).
38. 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
39. Id. at 312-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 294-95.
41. Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 60-62 (2d ed. 1967)).
42. Id.
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 n.io (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1962)).
44. 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (rejecting the broader "focus" test of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), despite apparent approval of that test in Miranda).




the latter holding that roadside questioning of a motorist forcibly detained
pursuant to a traffic stop does not constitute interrogation. Finally, in addition
to adopting a "routine booking question exception" to Miranda ,4 the Court
adopted a "public safety" exception to Miranda in New York v. Quarles,"
holding that when objective facts establish that "overriding considerations of
public safety justify the officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings,"
admission of the resulting statement does not violate the Fifth Amendment.'4
C. Wade v. United States's4 9 Limitation
Wade is less well known than Gideon, Miranda, or Mapp, but worth noting
here because it - like Gideon but unlike Miranda and Mapp - initially promised
not only protection of constitutional rights, but also protection against
wrongful conviction. Nonetheless, Wade's rationale and value were eviscerated
by subsequent cases.
Reasoning that a lineup compelled confrontation "between the accused and
the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously,
even crucially, derogate from a fair trial," Wade imposed the right to counsel
upon post-indictment lineups."o Wade also required suppression of any
identification that took place at an uncounseled post-indictment lineup, as well
as suppression of subsequent in-court identification unless the state can prove
that the in-court identification had an independent source.s'
Subsequent cases did not erode the literal holding of Wade, but they cannot
be reconciled with its rationale. In Kirby v. Illinois, the Burger Court held that a
pre-indictment lineup did not entitle the defendant to the presence of counsel,"
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts also expanded exceptions to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-
tree doctrine, thereby limiting further the applicability of Mapp and Miranda. With respect
to Miranda, the Court went even further, exempting from fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
analysis both the physical fruit of a Miranda violation, United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630
(2004), and a Mirandized "second" confession that followed an unwarned confession,
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), except where the technique of using successive
unwarned and warned phases is consciously employed to avoid the constraints of Miranda,
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 6oo (2004).
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
5o. Id. at 228.
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despite the unanswered and unanswerable retort of the dissenters that "there
inhere in a confrontation for identification conducted after arrest the identical
hazards to a fair trial that inhere in such a confrontation conducted 'after the
onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings."'s3 Then United States v. Ash held
that Wade only applied to corporeal lineups, not photographic arrays, even
after indictment" -a holding that any focus on avoiding wrongful conviction
would seem to preclude, given that experts on identification viewed
photographic identifications as less reliable than corporeal identifications.
Justice Brennan complained that the majority concluded that "a pretrial lineup
identification is a 'critical stage' of the prosecution because counsel's presence
can help to compensate for the accused's deficiencies as an observer, but that a
pretrial photographic identification is not a 'critical stage' of the prosecution
because the accused is not able to observe at all.""
D. Gideon's Expansion
Gideon itself did not specifically describe the crimes to which the right to
appointed counsel applies, but in Argersinger v. Hamlin,s' the Court held that
no person may be imprisoned for a crime without being offered the assistance
of counsel, reasoning that the rationale of Powell and Gideon "has relevance to
any criminal trial in which an accused is deprived of his liberty."I' Although the
Court refused to further extend Gideon to misdemeanor cases in which
imprisonment was a possible sanction but not actually imposeds and has
permitted the use of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to enhance
sentences in subsequent counseled sentencing proceedings, 9 it has prohibited
the imposition of either a suspended sentence or probation absent the
provision of counsel.6 o Moreover, since Gideon was decided, the right to
counsel's attachment has been pushed back in time to the first formal
s3. Id. at 697-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting id. at 690 (majority
opinion)).
54. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
ss. Id. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
S6. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
S. Id. at 32.
58. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
s9. Baldasar v. United States, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).




proceedings on a charge.'
Thus, whether one focuses on symbolic value, practical effect, or staying
power, Gideon stands alone, an "exceptional" beacon in the positive sense.
III. THE SHAM(E) OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL
A. The Importance ofAdequate Assistance ofDefense Counsel
Before allowing Gideon to rest on its legal laurels, we feel compelled, as
some might say is our contrarian nature, to make the case that it is only
partially a success story, especially if one examines Gideon's impact using two
highly relevant measures: the right to the effective assistance of counsel and the
right of an indigent defendant to investigative and expert services. Put
differently, Gideon may not be immune to the forces of anticrime sentiment
and a reactionary Supreme Court any more than the United States has been
immune to class immobility or free from moral taint.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In other
words, representation by counsel is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
satisfy the Gideon right. Both the Court's calibration of the legal standard for
testing the constitutional quality of counsel's representation, and the
application of that standard in cases (cases in which the Court both grants and
denies review) must be considered before rendering a final verdict on Gideon's
success. This is so because the right to counsel is only as strong as the
underlying commitment to the quality of representation provided by attorneys
for indigent defendants.
B. The Legal Standard for Adequate Assistance
In Strickland v. Washington," the Court established the now familiar two-
pronged test for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first
inquiry-the performance prong-asks whether counsel's conduct fell outside
61. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 18o (1984). Recently, the Roberts Court clarified that
initiation of formal proceedings, even in the absence of involvement by a prosecutor,
triggers attachment of that right. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
6a. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
63. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the "wide range of professionally competent assistance."6 4 The second
inquiry-the prejudice prong-asks whether, but for counsel's acts or
omissions, there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the proceeding
would have been different."' In fleshing out the scope of the two inquires, both
in Strickland and subsequent cases, the Court has made clear that the
"[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,"" and
that the standard is, and is supposed to be, difficult to satisfy.6 ' The Court
created a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance., 68 Reviewing courts have been
admonished that strategic decisions made after an adequate investigation are
virtually unassailable, and that courts should make "every effort . . . to
eliminate the distorting effect of hindsight." 69
As numerous scholars have noted, the Strickland standard has proven to be
a formidable obstacle to defendants alleging that they were deprived of their
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel."o Not only is
Strickland's substantive standard onerous, but there are also practical and legal
barriers to successfully challenging the adequacy of counsel's representation."
While in the last decade the Court has loosened the legal stranglehold to some
64. Id. at 690.
65. Id. at 694.
66. Id. at 689; see also Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740 (2011) ("[T]he standard for judging
counsel's representation is a most deferential one.").
67. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1472, 1485 (2010) ("Surmounting Strickland's high bar is
never an easy task.").
68. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. According to the Strickland majority, "[e]ven the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, "It's Like Deja Vu All Over Again": Williams
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 129 (2007); see also
Sanjay K. Chhablani, Detangling the Right to Efective Assistance of Counsel, 6o SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1, 2-4 (2009); Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REV.
425, 455-56 (2011).
71. As for practical barriers, in many jurisdictions, for example, inmates have no right to
postconviction counsel and thus must challenge trial counsel's competency, if at all, without
an attorney's assistance. An additional legal barrier when ineffective assistance claims are
raised in the federal habeas corpus context, as they commonly are, is 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(d),
which limits a federal court's ability to grant the writ of habeas corpus to cases where the
state court's resolution of the constitutional issue was "unreasonable." The Supreme Court
has made clear that when federal courts review a state court's rejection of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on federal habeas, its review should be "doubly deferential."




degree and in some contexts - e.g., capital cases involving trial counsel who fail
to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence"- shockingly poor
representation is often approved by the Supreme Court of the United States,
the lower federal courts, and the state courts during plea bargaining, trial, and
on direct appeal. While a detailed canvassing of ineffective assistance of counsel
cases is beyond the scope of this Essay, we will discuss one of the Court's most
recent cases in more detail, Harrington v. Richter." We do so both to critique
several critical implications of the legal standard governing such claims and to
provide context for the discussion in Part IV of a defendant's right to expert
assistance.
C. Judicial Approval oflnadequate Assistance
Joshua Richter was charged with murder and related crimes in Sacramento
County, California. Patrick Klein was shot and killed, and his friend Joshua
Johnson, an admitted drug dealer, was shot twice but survived.14 Johnson
identified Richter and another man, Christian Branscombe, as the
perpetrators.75 The prosecution built its case on Johnson's testimony and other
circumstantial evidence, including ballistics evidence matching a bullet and a
shell casing to ammunition found in Richter's home." Blood samples were also
72. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (per curiam) (holding that the state
court used an incorrect prejudice inquiry when reviewing Sears's claim that trial counsel
failed to develop and present evidence of "significant frontal lobe brain damage" and drug
and alcohol dependence); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) (finding
that trial counsel's failure to develop and present evidence regarding Porter's military service
in Korea and other psychological impairments was unreasonable); Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374 (2005) (holding that trial counsel's failure to discover evidence regarding the
defendant's social history and mental impairments, including possible fetal alcohol
syndrome, was unreasonable); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (holding that trial
counsel's failure to properly investigate the defendant's history of physical and sexual abuse,
homelessness, and diminished mental state was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362 (2000) (holding that trial counsel's failure to discover mitigating evidence of the
defendant's childhood abuse, mental retardation, and helpfulness to prison officials was
unreasonable). It is important to note, however, that during the same time period the Court
has also reversed the decisions of a number of federal courts of appeals that had concluded
that death-sentenced inmates were denied the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Smith
v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139 (2oo9); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) (per curiam); Bobby
v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (per curiam).
73. 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
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taken from several locations in the house, but, for reasons still unknown, not
from a blood pool found in the doorway of the victim's bedroom.' Richter's
attorney also failed to retain an expert to evaluate the blood spatter or the
source of the blood.78
In his opening statement, trial counsel laid out the defense theory that
Branscombe had fired on Johnson in self-defense, and that Klein had been
killed not on the living-room couch where his body was found, but in the
doorway near the pool of blood by crossfire between Branscombe and
Richter." Counsel also criticized the police for conducting a deficient
investigation, specifically highlighting the failure to analyze the blood spatter
patterns and the pool of blood found in the doorway where defense counsel
alleged Klein was shot.o Quite predictably, the prosecution immediately had
the blood analyzed and also called a forensic expert in blood pattern evidence."
Richter testified in his own defense that his codefendant shot in self-defense,
but trial counsel presented no forensic expert testimony. The jury found
Richter guilty of all charges, and he was sentenced to life without parole."
Richter then challenged his convictions, arguing that trial counsel's failure to
secure forensic expert assistance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Richter supported his claim with expert affidavits in serology and blood spatter
that, in sum, supported his self-defense assertion and undermined Johnson's
account of the incident." Eventually, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Richter
that trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.*
After the now-standard boilerplate about Strickland's "high bar" and the
"harsh light of hindsight,"s the Court concluded that "[e]ven if it had been
apparent that expert blood testimony could support Richter's defense, it would
be reasonable to conclude that a competent attorney might elect not to use
it.",' In the majority's view, concentrating on the blood pool carried "serious
77. Id.
78. Id. at 783.




83. Id. at 783.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 788-89 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010); Bell v. Cove, 535
U.S. 685, 702 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).




risks" because forensic analysis could have "demonstrated that the blood came
from Johnson alone," thus exposing Richter's story as an "invention.",' The
Court further explained that "making a central issue out of blood evidence
would have increased the likelihood of the prosecution's producing its own
evidence on the blood pool's origins and composition; and once matters
proceeded on this course, there was a serious risk that expert evidence could
destroy Richter's case."" Strickland, the Court stated, "does not enact
Newton's third law for the presentation of evidence, requiring for every
prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the defense."8' Rather, in
many cases, "cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an
expert's presentation.""o
The Court's reasoning was almost as shoddy as trial counsel's
representation. Had Richter's trial counsel not stood up in his opening
statement and attacked the failure of the police and prosecution to do any
forensic analysis of the blood pool and spatter, it might be possible to argue
that the Richter's trial counsel's representation was minimally constitutionally
sufficient. 91 But he did challenge the integrity of the investigation. Any
competent lawyer would have understood that the prosecution would react in
exactly the manner it did in Richter's case and immediately have the forensic
experts that serve at its beck and call analyze the evidence. Making such an
attack, without having any idea what the inevitable forensic analysis of the
blood pool and blood spatter analysis might produce, was gross
87. Id.
88. Id. at 790.
89. Id. at 791.
go. Id. As to prejudice, the Court concluded that Richter's claim failed because his expert
evidence established only a "theoretical possibility" that Klein's blood was intermixed with
Johnson's blood and did not counter every conclusion reached by the prosecution's experts.
Id. at 792. The Court also believed that there was "sufficient conventional circumstantial
evidence pointing to Richter's guilt." Id. Thus there was not a reasonable probability that
the outcome would have been different. Id.
91. The obstacle to such an argument is that before selecting a defense strategy, competent
counsel would- at a minimum - have consulted with a serologist and a blood spatter expert.
While some types of analysis would have required access to the samples in the possession of
law enforcement which, arguably, an attorney might not have wanted to request in order to
"let sleeping dogs lie," other types of analysis -i.e., an examination of the size of the blood
pool and the blood spatter patterns -could have been conducted using the crime scene
photographs which were in trial counsel's possession. There is no plausible justification for
failing to do so.
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incompetence.
Thus, as to the first measure we believe is relevant to assessing the
Supreme Court's true commitment to Gideon -ensuring quality representation
by attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants-both the Court's
articulation and application of the legal rules governing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel have resulted in judicial sanctioning of widespread,
substandard representation by defense counsel. In many cases, the right
guaranteed by Gideon is ephemeral, and will continue to be as long as courts
tolerate representation like that provided by Richter's trial counsel.
To be clear, and to avoid the criticism that we paint with too broad a brush,
we do not mean to malign all, or even nearly all, criminal defense counsel.
Some are excellent, many are very good, and most work under difficult
conditions with unmanageable caseloads and grossly inadequate resources."
Numerous studies have demonstrated that only a fraction of public funds
poured annually into the American criminal justice system by the federal
government as well as state and local governments are allotted for indigent
defense.94 And many public defender offices, and private counsel who
specialize in the representation of indigent defendants, have caseloads that are
simply crushing.95 The sad reality is that, due to a convergence of
92. As noted previously, there are numerous other cases involving very poor representation
sanctioned by courts, including the Supreme Court, relying upon the Strickland standard.
We refer any reader who may suspect we "cherrypicked" Richter to Blume & Neumann,
supra note 70, at 159-64, for a discussion of other cases. See also John H. Blume, The Dance of
Death or (Almost) "No One Here Gets Out Alive": The Fourth Circuit's Capital Punishment
jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REv. 465, 476-79 (2010) (discussing unsuccessful ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the Fourth Circuit); Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume &
Patrick M. Wilson, Racial Epithets in the Criminal Process, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 755, 768-72
(discussing ineffective assistance of counsel cases based on defense counsel's racial animus).
93. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (20o6).
94. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 38
(2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dani/aba/administrative/legal aid indigent
_defendants/s_sclaid-def bp right-to counsel in criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
(finding that funding for indigent defense services is "shamefully inadequate"); Backus
& Marcus, supra note 93, at 1045 (2005) ("By every measure, in every report analyzing the
U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically
underfinanced."); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts To Address Underfunded
Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1734 (2005) (noting that indigent defense
systems receive only two percent of total state and federal criminal justice expenditures).
95. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,




circumstances, many criminal defense attorneys lack basic competence and
routinely deprive their clients of constitutionally adequate representation.
Nonetheless, regardless of who bears responsibility for the shame of poor
representation, it is a shame, and it renders the promise of Gideon a sham to
those defendants unfortunate enough to receive no real assistance from the
counsel appointed to represent them.
IV. COUNSEL'S NEED FOR ASSISTANCE
Even when his counsel is competent and diligent, a defendant may be
deprived of the promise of Gideon due to a lack of investigative and expert
services. A lawyer, even a very skilled and highly competent lawyer, is no
longer enough. Prosecutors have at their disposal police investigators, experts
in a wide array of forensic sciences, and mental health professionals to assist in
the prosecution of criminal cases. There are literally hundreds of "crime
laboratories" funded by the FBI, states, counties, and cities, as well as medical
examiners' and coroners' offices, and federal, state, and local psychiatric and
mental health centers, which serve the prosecution.96 Access to similar types of
services on the defense side, however, is much more limited.
In a decision rendered almost three decades ago, the Supreme Court
recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma that "when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense."97 The
Court further explained that because "mere access to the courthouse doors does
not by itself assure" a fair trial, the state has the responsibility to provide "the
raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense."98 Consequently,
the Court held, the Due Process Clause requires states to provide indigent
defendants with the "basic tools" of an adequate defense.99 But in the years
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/books/1ssclaid def securing
_reasonable caseloads.authcheckdam.pdf ("While the most frequent and worst examples of
out-of-control caseloads are among public defenders, private lawyers who provide indigent
defense services sometimes take on way too much work as well.").
g6. See Matthew R. Durose, Kelly A. Walsh & Andrea M. Burch, Census of Publicly Funded-
Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2009, BuREAu OF JUST. STAT. (2012), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
/content/pub/pdf/cpffclo9.pdf.
97. 470 U.S. 68,76 (1985)-
98. Id. at 77.
99. Id. The Court overturned Glen Burton Ake's conviction and death sentence because his
request for psychiatric assistance to both develop an insanity defense and rebut the state's
sentencing assertion that he presented a future danger was denied, thus depriving him of
due process. Id. at 86-87.
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since Ake, most courts have interpreted "basic tools" to mean an investigative
or expert service that is absolutely necessary to the defense."oo This is a showing
that is frequently impossible to make without access to the very services that
counsel for the defendant is requesting. As the adage goes, "you don't know
what you don't know." And, despite numerous invitations to do so, the
Supreme Court has refused to clarify the scope of the right created in Ake,"o'
leaving its promise of something approaching parity unfulfilled.
This is not only disappointing but somewhat surprising given the Court's
decisions in other constitutional contexts. In the Confrontation Clause context,
for example, the Court has required that state forensic examiners whose work
is to be introduced as evidence must be subject to cross-examination, noting
that "[florensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of
manipulation."0 2 Citing a National Academy of Sciences report calling into
question the neutrality of crime laboratories, most of which are administered
by law enforcement agencies, the Court noted that "[a] forensic analyst
responding to a request from a law enforcement agency may feel pressure -or
have an incentive-to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the
prosecution."' 03 The risk of error, mistake, or manipulation is heightened by
the "wide variability across forensic science disciplines with regard to
techniques, methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors,
research, general acceptability, and published material.""0 4 The Court also
relied upon a study of wrongful convictions that concluded "invalid forensic
testimony" contributed to the conviction in sixty percent of the cases.' Thus,
the Court deemed confrontation of the witness to be an essential tool in
"weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as
well."1o6
100. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 802 (6th ed. 2000) ("Generally speaking the courts have read Ake
narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely
essential to the defense.").
101. Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent Defendant's 'Right' to an Expert Witness: A
Promise Denied or Imagined?, 1o WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 401, 401 (2002).
102. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).
103. Id. The report referenced by the Court is NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
104. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD.,
supra note 103, at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
los. Id. at 319 (citing Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony





We have no quarrel with the Court guaranteeing a defendant's right to
confront an expert witness called by the prosecution, but it simply highlights
the inadequacy of the defendant's right to expert services."o7 First, in many
cases, without access to an independent expert, the confrontation right itself
will be inadequate. Setting aside problems with the general competence of
many criminal defense lawyers discussed in Part III,10' the highly technical
nature of many forensic sciences-e.g., DNA evidence-makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for even an effective, motivated attorney to prepare and
conduct a meaningful cross-examination. o9 In some instances counsel will be
able to discern areas to probe during cross-examination by reviewing the
forensic analyst's report and the underlying data and by consulting secondary
sources such as treatises and manuals. In the majority of cases, however,
without access to someone with actual substantive knowledge of the
underlying discipline, counsel will simply not know what questions to ask the
prosecution's expert witness.no Thus defense counsel will have two
unattractive options: ask little to nothing on cross-examination, or, in violation
107. Moreover, even the right to confront prosecution experts was diminished last term in
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). In Williams, the Court, in a four-one-four
decision, found no Confrontation Clause violation when a state forensic expert was able to
report the results of DNA testing conducted by another examiner at another laboratory. The
extent to which the right was limited, however, is unclear given that five Justices did not
agree on any single theory as to why there was no Confrontation Clause violation. See
Jeffrey Fisher, The Holdings and Implications ofWilliams v. Illinois, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20,
2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.conV?p=147095.
108. But see Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F. 3d 783, 792 (4 th Cir. 2o1) (finding that counsel's failure to
challenge the prosecution's forensic evidence was unreasonable and prejudicial because "the
need for scrutiny of the forensic evidence was indisputable"). The court's decision in Elmore
is the exception, not the rule, and the result was driven by the strong likelihood that Elmore
was wrongfully convicted.
109. See Steve Mills, Weak DNA Evidence Could Undermine justice, Experts Say, CHI. TRIB., July 5,
2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-o5/news/ct-met-dna-questions-20120705
1_forensic-dna-analysis-dna-profile-dna-scientists (discussing the wrongful conviction of
Cleveland Barrett after the prosecution presented DNA evidence that defense counsel
vigorously attacked on cross-examination but the jury nevertheless credited). Speaking
about the case, a leading scientist, William Thompson, noted that juries can give DNA
evidence "too much weight." Id.
11o. We would also note that most lawyers went to law school for a reason, and proficiency in
science is not that reason. As a result, much prosecution forensic evidence is effectively ex
parte which the defense cannot challenge in anything other than a pro forma manner due to
the lack of a defense expert. Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and
Expert Witnesses, 76 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1534 (2007).
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of the cardinal rule of cross-examination,"' ask questions to which she does not
know the answer.
Even an informed, vigorous cross-examination is often no substitute for a
defense expert witness. What is more likely to deter the fraudulent or
incompetent state forensic examiner -the prospect of being cross-examined by
a potentially ill-informed defense attorney, or the fact that the work will be
reviewed by a competent, independent scientist? The fear of cross-examination
did not deter Fred Zain of West Virginia, Joyce Gilchrist of Oklahoma, or
Michael West of Mississippi, three now-disgraced state forensic examiners
who engaged in literally hundreds of acts of forensic fraud that led to a number
of known wrongful convictions."' Their incompetence and fraud
went undetected for years. Even the so-called gold standard of crime
laboratories -the FBI crime lab-has had its fair share of scandals and
incompetent examiners that, again, went unexposed, in some instances for
more than a decade."' No one can say with certainty which of these individuals
would have been deterred had they had known their work would be reviewed
by an independent, competent expert in the field, but it seems likely that some
of them would.
It is the rare criminal case today in which investigative and expert services
are not a "basic tool" of an adequate defense."4 Often, expert assistance is
needed to analyze the results obtained by the prosecution's forensic examiners,
to conduct similar or additional testing, and possibly to provide testimony in
rebuttal at trial."s In other cases, expert assistance is needed to analyze evidence
ms. James W. McElhaney, Cross-Exam Surprises: If You Don't Look for Them, They Can Blow
Up in Your Face, A.B.A. J., Oct. 24, 20o6, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article
/cross exam surprises.
11z. See Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note iio, at 1497-1506 (2007) (detailing numerous cases
in which forensic examiners presented false, incomplete, or highly misleading testimony).
113. See John Solomon, Associated Press, FBI Lab Work Under Serious Scrutiny, CBS NEWS (Feb.
11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-544209.html (discussing, among other
issues in the lab, the indictment of former FBI scientist Kathleen Lundy for knowingly
giving false testimony about lead-bullet analysis); see also JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K.
WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME LAB (1998).
114. Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, ISSUES Sa. & TECH. ONLINE, Summer 2000,
http://www.issues.org/16.4/breyer.htm ("Scientific issues permeate the law."); see also Paul
C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA
World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1326 (2004) (noting the "dramatic increased use of
scientific evidence").
115. Cf NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE




that law enforcement overlooked or did not deem sufficiently relevant to
evaluate, but which may be valuable, if not essential, to the defense."' Expert
assistance may be needed to provide context to the jury to explain why the
prosecution's evidence may not be as incriminating as it seems-for example,
the fallibility of eyewitness identification evidence or the markers of a false
confession.117 Finally, mental health experts are frequently needed to determine
whether the defendant has a mental illness or impairment that may be relevant
to competency, criminal responsibility, or to sentencing."8
Yet despite the clear needs that indigent defendants have if they are to be
provided with the "basic tools" of an adequate defense, they are often forced to
run the gauntlet with only an attorney-and in many cases not a very good
one-to assist them. To date, the Supreme Court and the lower state and
federal courts have allowed this unfair disparity in resources to persist."
CONCLUSION
We end this Essay on a pessimistic note. It is true that compared with
many of the other groundbreaking criminal procedure decisions of the Warren
Court, Gideon is a success story. The Court established a fully retroactive right
to counsel for indigent defendants, and it did not in subsequent years and cases
eviscerate that right with exceptions and other limitations as it did in other
areas of criminal procedure. Gideon's core guarantee of counsel remains fully
intact. Thus, in that sense, Gideon is exceptional. But the mere presence of an
attorney is no panacea for the ills of the twenty-first-century criminal justice
system. Until the Supreme Court both significantly raises the bar as to the
quality of representation that satisfies the Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel and requires states to provide more than paltry
investigative and expert services to indigent defendants, Gideon will remain an
unfulfilled dream of what could and should have been. We are far from
experts where it is necessary or appropriate to prepare the defense, understand the
prosecution's case, or rebut the prosecution's case).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identification and the
Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 772 (2007) (noting that because jurors
conflate certainty and accuracy, cross-examination is not effective in casting doubt on
erroneous eyewitness identifications).
118. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS §§ 7-1.1, -3.3, -4.2 (all noting the
critical role mental health professionals play to defense counsel on issues of competency,
criminal responsibility and sentencing).
119. For a comprehensive discussion of the variety of types of expert assistance requested by
counsel for criminal defendants and (often) denied by courts, see Giannelli, supra note 114.
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neoconservatives, and equally far from John Winthrop, but we would be happy
to tout the "shining city on a hill" when its light actually shines on all indigent
defendants.
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